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The possibilities and constraints of the energy sector in Mexico are prefigured by the
legal and policy framework in which lenders, private developers and contractors are allowed
to operate in Mexico. The ability of the government to finance energy projects in Mexico
will be governed as much by legal issues as by commercial opportunities.
This paper argues that during the period 1991-94, the Mexican Government estab-
lished a creative conceptual framework that can be adapted to meet the increasingly exact-
ing requirements of prospective project lenders to the energy sector.
By the end of 1994, however, the work to adapt this framework had not yet begun,
thereby putting in jeopardy the vision that private financing could fund infrastructure
needs in electric power generation and other areas.
L Introduction
The hallmark of the presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-94) was modernization of the
administration of the public sector. In the energy sector, but mainly in the government's
petroleum supply agency, Pemex, the goal of modernization has been the achieving of inter-
national competitiveness. As Francisco Rojas (Pemex CEO, 1987-94) put it, Pemex "is root-
ing itself as a highly efficient firm, capable of competing on an equal footing with the largest
of international consortia and acting as a pole of attraction in industrial development."
2
Since 1989, the West has seen the progressive evolution of the command economies of
Eastern Europe and the Former USSR. The general observation is that, on a sector-by-sector
basis, these centralized economies have evolved toward either market economies or mixed
economies (Fig. 1).
This general trend has not been limited to Eastern Europe, however. Throughout the
world, economic sectors that were once under the management of a command economy
1. George Baker directs MEXIco ENERGY INTELLIGENCE, a newsletter service based in Oakland,
California.
2. Pemex, Annual Report, 1993, p. 5. Message from the Director General.
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have now transformed themselves into market or mixed economies. 3 In Mexico, important
sectors of an economy that was tightly closed in the 1960s, '70s and early '80s began, in
1985, to move toward a market economy. Mexico's entry into GATT in 1985, NAFTA in
1993 and the OECD in 1994, are symbolic steps of this progressive commitment toward a
market economy. Pemex, meanwhile, has insisted on the continuation of the basic com-
mand model for the hydrocarbon sector.4
In petrochemicals, Pemex and the government agreed to increase the degree to which
there would be a mixed economy: both Pemex and private capital would have access to raw
materials and markets for "secondary" petrochemicals.
In the matter of electricity generation, in late 1992, Pemex, the Federal Power Utility
(CFE) and the Commerce Ministry agreed that henceforth Mexico would operate as a
mixed economy: a new law and set of regulations now permit the private generation of elec-
tricity through the mechanisms of a co-generation plant or an Independent Power
Producer (IPP). In the core businesses of Pemex, however, there was no interest whatsoever
in either a market or mixed economy (Fig. 2).
II. The Search for International Benchmarks in PEMEX
Hydrocarbon-sector planners, led by Adrian Lajous, Ernesto Marcos and Jos6 Luis
Alberro (Pemex's SVPs for Investment Policy, Finance, and Gas Distribution), developed a
3. There can only be an analogy between the Mexican economy and that of the Former Soviet
Union. The Mexican system of government unquestionably corresponds to the command model:
the legislative, judicial and local branches of government are, in substance, sub-sets of the execu-
tive branch. All major economy players in Mexico are either government agencies (PEMEX, CFE,
railroads), government contractors (e.g., PROTEXA, ICA, BUFETE INDUSTRIAL) or thrive by
the monopolistic or oligopolistic favors granted by the government (e.g., TELEVISA, TELE-
FONOS DE MEXICO, CEMENTOS MEXICANOS, VOLKSWAGEN, CHRYSLER, FORD, GM).
In such a world of what David Asman (Wall Street Journal, Oct. 5, 1994, p. A18) calls "executive
paternalism" there is a loose sense in which government criteria and review processes coordinate
the resource-allocation decisions and operations of the major actors in the economy. No one
doubts that the government has the effective veto power to stop any actor from taking an invest-
ment decision: it simply withholds "permits.'
4. Petroleum law in Mexico dates back to 1901. Up until 1938 the Mexican State's relationship to the
oil industry in Mexico was that of a regulator. See Clagett and Valderrama, A Revised Guide to the
Law 6- Legal Literature of Mexico, pp. 286-95 (1973). An earlier discussion, which gives a bibliog-
raphy of Mexican court cases dealing with petroleum law, is Roscoe B. Gaither, Expropriation in
Mexico: The Facts and the Law (New York. William Morrow, 1940).
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new model for economic growth. Beginning in 1989, Pemex began to seek international
standards and benchmarks for its operations both upstream and downstream. 5
Starting in January of that year, the government took draconian measures to reduce the
size and influence of the oil union, the cost of which to the economy, by some estimates,
was equivalent to as much as $2-3/bbl of oil production. Where, at the beginning of 1989,
Pemex had roughly 215,000 employees, by the beginning of 1994 Pemex had cut roughly
100,000 jobs from the payroll.
McKinsey & Company, along with other blue-ribbon consulting firms such as SRI
International and Arthur D. Little, Inc., was hired by Pemex to assess the international com-
petitiveness of its operations. McKinsey recommended its standard formula: cut staff, reor-
ganize into core business units,6 and regulate the relationships between business units by
means of transfer prices for goods and services. The McKinsey formula, which is designed
to help companies become more competitive in market economies, took on an unexpected
meaning in the context of a state monopoly. In Mexico, supply decisions and demand
assessments of the domestic market are not taken on the basis of an assessment of competi-
tive forces, and, for this reason, there is no true market mechanism at all in Mexico.
In environmental policy, planners decided that the old Azcapotzalco refinery could not
be operated within environmental norms-and, abruptly, on March 18, 1990, President
Carlos Salinas announced the refinery would be dosed immediately. In subsequent years
Pemex upgraded the quality of its refined products, introducing unleaded gasoline and low-
sulfur diesel and fuel oil. In addition, a major study on Mexico City air quality was carried
out jointly by Pemex, the Petroleum Institute (IMP) and the Los Alamos Laboratory of the
U.S. Department of Defense (the final report of which was completed in mid- 1994).
In the areas of natural gas transmission and distribution, Pemex retained Gaz de
France as a consultant in 1993. Pemex reasoned that France's experience with a mixed econ-
omy in the natural gas industry might lead to new insights about gas transmission and dis-
5. A discussion of the evolution of Pemex modernization programs since 1970, but with emphasis
on the period 1988-93, is H~ctor Leos Chavez, Origen y naturaleza de la modernizaci6n de
Petr6leos Mexicanos [Origin and nature of the modernization of Pemex] (Mexico DF: UNAM
[Programa Universitario de Energia], 1993). Related discussions of the reorganization of Pemex
are Francisco Colemenares, Pemex: Crisis y Restructuraci6n. (Mexico DF: UNAM (Programa
Universitario de Energia), 1991) and Angel de la Vega Navarro, "Ouverture et lib&alisation de 1'6-
conomie et r~organisation de l'industrie ptrolire au Mexique,; Revue de L'nergie (Paris), No.
456:95-104 (Fvrier 1994).
6. The unveiling of the plan to reorganize Pemex into core business units took place in early June of
1992, apparently as one of the government's responses to the Guadalajara explosions of April 22.
The new "organic law" of Pemex was approved by the Congress on July 17, 1992. See L6pez-
Velarde, Mexico's New Petroleum Law: The Internal Reforms at Pemex and the North American Free
Trade Agreement, THE INT'L LAWYER XXVIII(l): 1-27 (Spring, 1994), and Berdeja-Prieto and
16pez-Velarde, Mexico, INT'L FIN. LAw REV, (Oct. 1994).
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tribution.7 In the area of public safety and environmental policy, Pemex established a high-
level office that reports directly to the Pemex general manager.
8
III. The Concept of Virtual Economy
In this way, Pemex planners, recognizing the limitations of a centralized, command
economy in the hydrocarbon sector, devised a new theoretical vision, here called the Virtual
Market Economy (Fig. 3). The idea would be to achieve the efficiencies of a market econo-
my while still remaining within the legal framework of a state monopoly. The new vision
was that of a virtual market economy, one that would stimulate intracompany competitive-
ness and excellence by simulating market-economic conditions. Pemex operating units
would be held accountable for international reference prices and performance benchmarks.
Achieving such standards would be tantamount to achieving market competitiveness. This
goal was at the heart of the Pemex modernization programs of 1989-94. 9
Pemex, which by July 1992, would have a new organic law that established three operat-
ing energy units (plus a petrochemical unit), would hold itself responsible for meeting
international standards of performance in its distinct areas of operations. Thus, in February
of 1991 Pemex contracted with Triton International, Inc., of Houston to drill the first
turnkey well done under direct contract with an American company in decades. (In the
years of the Oil Boom, 1977-82, drilling contractors like Houston-based Sedco operated in
7. Such insights, however, are likely not to square with the practices of Mexico's NAFTA partners. In
France, the concept of open-access in gas transmission is viewed negatively, while in Canada and
the United States, the concept is credited with stimulating demand and lowering costs to the con-
sumer.
8. Both the environment and public safety have been at risk by the operations of the state oil and
electric-power agencies in Mexico. The Administration of Miguel de la Madrid saw the explosion
of an LPG plant in a Mexico City lower-class suburb in 1984, and the Salinas Administration saw
the explosion of gasoline-filled sewer lines in a lower-class neighborhood in Guadalajara on April
22, 1992. In each instance hundreds of lives were believed to have been lost.
9. The distinction between a mixed and a virtual economy is made in the Mexican case on the fol-
lowing grounds: A mixed economy would have the state as co-producer, co-transporter, co-dis-
tributor; in Mexico there are no co-producers in petroleum at all. There are private jobbers, who
truck Pemex petroleum products under contract with Pemex, and there are a dozen gas LDCs
that serve tiny residential markets. So, in hydrocarbon energy, Pemex is the sole producer and vir-
tual sole-transporter and distributor (as well as virtual self-regulator). Nevertheless, Pemex
(under Lajous's leadership) insisted that it would achieve the efficiency of a market economy (the
Pemex code word is "international competitiveness") by incorporating international benchmark
prices and performance standards-but not by introducing international competitors.
Competition, therefore, will be indirect, but real. It is the indirectness that justifies the distinction
between a mixed economy la PDVSA and a "virtual market economy" A la Pemex.
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Mexican waters, but as sub-contractors to Mexican contractors like Permargo.)10 The
Triton contract showed Pemex that normal drilling time in the Gulf of Campeche should be
in the area of 125 days (and possibly under 100 days), not the 265 days that Pemex typically
took to complete an offshore well. 11
The upshot of these and other steps was a striking veering away from the worldwide
trend toward either a market or mixed economy. In the model of the Virtual Market
Economy Pemex seeks debt-financing1 2 or off-balance-sheet financing (via leases and
stand-alone, project financing1 3) for programs that meet international standards of perfor-
mance, output and environmental quality (Fig. 3).
Pemex, as a state monopoly, proposes to keep its high ground as a true command econ-
omy, and is unfazed by the moves of countries like Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and
Colombia toward a mixed economy in upstream and downstream operations. Pemex's bold
move has been toward a Virtual Market Economy (Fig. 4).
A closer look at the innovations in hydrocarbon policy in other countries (like
Venezuela, for instance) that have opted in favor of a mixed economy shows that it's usually
the case that not all industrial areas are included in the mixed economy model. Thus,
Venezuela permits co-production (hence, a mixed economy) in exploration and produc-
tion, but not in domestic refining or local distribution. In some instances, government poli-
cy permits private investment in multiple areas, but builds in some anti-trust precautions.
In Argentina, the government adopted a mixed economy model, and wisely separated the
market functions of gas transmission from gas distribution, letting investors choose
between transmission lines or distribution systems, but not both (Fig. 5).
10. Ixtoc I, the offshore well that went out of control for over six months in Campeche in 1978-79,
was operated by Sedco, under contract with Permargo. (George Bush and Jorge Diaz Serrano were
among the founders of Permargo.)
11. Pemex, Gerencia de Informaci6n y Relaciones Pdblicas (GIRP), Boletin 322/91, Sep. 24 de 1991.
Triton drilled the exploratory well Takin No. 1 in the Bay of Campeche in 127 days. In late 1991
senior Triton management believed the time could be reduced to as few as 90 days. GIRP, Boletin
121/91, 19/1V/91, says that Triton presented the best option for Pemex in a bidding process in
which Mexican and international companies competed-
12. On November 4, 1990, President George Bush, meeting with his Mexican counterpart in
Monterrey, announced U.S. Ex-Im Bank funding in the area of $6 billion for oil production and
the development of hydrocarbon reserves. Under the Bush Administration, the U.S. Government
was very supportive of Pemex's Virtual Market Economy model, as it meant a new source of con-
tracts for U.S. oilfield service and equipment suppliers.
13. As of mid-1994, the only instance of non-recourse financing in the energy sector in Mexico has
been the funding for the jointly-ventured refurbishing of a Shell refinery in Houston. Bankers
observed that the success of this project hinged on Shell's participation and the Texas location of
the refinery assets as much as it did on Pemex's ability to supply crude oil and guarantee 45 Kbd
of product off-take. Said differently, the project would not have been funded on a non-recourse
basis without the participation of an international company and had the refinery assets been in
Mexico.
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IV Accomplishments and Criticisms of Salinas's Administration of PEMEX
Throughout the six-year Salinas presidency Pemex maintained oil and gas production
steady, at about 2.6 MM b/d and 3.5 bcfd. Oil exports were also steady, at about 1.3 MM
b/d. 14 Pemex's payroll was cut back nearly 50%, and the control of the Oil Union on Pemex
hiring was broken.
On the qualitative side, one of the accomplishments of the Salinas Administration was
holding firm in regards to foreign investment in the petroleum sector during the NAFTA
negotiations (1991-93). Mexican negotiators turned back every attempt to modify the exist-
ing practices (codified or not 15 ) in the energy sector.
A second accomplishment was the creation of a new economic model - the Virtual
Market Economy. This model succeeded in bringing in perhaps twenty billion dollars in
debt-instrument funding for Pemex infrastructure needs. In addition, it brought in an extra
billion dollars in non-recourse project financing for Pemex's joint venture with Shell USA
in the to-be-refurbished Houston refinery at Deer Park.
Yet this model has its limits and its critics. Some critics say that having a Virtual Market
Economy does not bring all of the efficiencies of a market economy, as the "decision to correct
course" is again taken by the command model, not as a result of the conflict of market forces. 16
14. In the weeks following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August, 1990, Mexico announced that
it would help cover the world oil supply shortage by increasing exports by 100 Kbd, a symbolic
gesture regarded as controversial inside Pemex and the Energy Ministry, owing to the risk of dam-
aging reservoirs from over-production. (Pemex's safe production margin was in the neighbor-
hood of 20 Kbd.).
15. It was widely believed outside of Mexico that there was no legal, constitutional or regulatory
restriction that would have prevented the Government from authorizing foreign investment in
gasoline retailing. The only constitutional restriction is that title to petroleum products is to
remain with the State until sold to the consumer-thereby putting the retailer's earnings on the
basis of a volume-indexed commission. Mexican service stations are currently operated by private
parties on this basis, and foreign operators (had they been authorized) would have been willing to
compete under the same regulations.
16. Any decision to correct course, in turn, is a slow and uncertain one, given the culture in Pemex
that requires a complex checking up and down the chain of formal and informal command. In
June, 1981, Pemex's CEO, Jorge Diaz Serrano, tried to "correct" the export price of Mexican crude
(by lowering the price $2/bbl)-only to be forced out of office for his 'failure" to get prior
approval from the Economic Cabinet. As a result of the ensuing failure to correct prices, Mexico's
oil exports, which were in the area of 1.5 million b/d in April, fell precipitously-while bureau-
crats argued pricing philosophy-to under 500 Kbd in July. This catastrophic miscalculation pre-
cipitated capital flight, then a painful series of devaluations that were only corrected during the
Salinas Administration, some ten years later.
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Their comment, in short, is that successful simulation of market conditions is still a risky
way to stimulate market competitiveness. 17
Historically, Pemex has been an organization that responds more to political considera-
tions than to quantitative measures of performance. A case in point is the time warp in rela-
tion to the publication of Pemex's operating regulations. While the new "organic law" of
Pemex was issued in July 1992, two years later Pemex's operating regulations (reglamento)
continue to be those issued in August of 1972. Why? The main reason is that Pemex's oper-
ating units do not agree among themselves as to the assignment of assets and liabilities that
should correspond to each unit. A second point of disagreement concerns the assignment of
public trust and responsibility (e.g., public and industrial safety, care of the environment,
quality assurance and reliability of supply).
Pemex units are also in disagreement with cabinet ministries, mainly Commerce,
Finance and Energy, regarding the role of private investment and the weight that should be
given to the demands of prospective lenders. (In the view of the ministries, the funding
premise of the electric power development plan for the period 1995-2004, namely, that a
significant share of investment capital would come from private lenders who would not ask
for a sovereign guarantee, is currently in question mainly because they fear that funds will
not be made available.)18
Other critics say that the model provides for no market incentive to lower production
costs, and that, at the end of the day, it brings in too little money for the development of
Mexico's energy infrastructure and the expansion of energy markets. 19 Where in the first
17. An example of this policy risk is in the area of private electric power generation. According to the
new law of December 1992 and the operating regulations of May 1993, private capital may invest
in electric power generation, but only on the condition that power in excess of internal consump-
tion be sold to the CFE. The Virtual Market Economy model is able to provide reference prices for
most, but not all of, the elements needed to make a fundable business: Pemex will be able to quote
U.S. Gulf Coast reference prices for wellhead gas and gas transmission, thereby simulating U.S.
market conditions, but the CFE is limited in its ability to set consumer prices by considerations of
social policy that come from the Commerce, Finance and Energy Ministries. How, then, will a pri-
vate Independent Power Producer (IPP) be able to invest in a power plant if he knows that only
his costs--but not his tariff rates-will be indexed to international prices? The concern is that
prospective non-recourse lenders will not be forthcoming for any such power projects in Mexico.
18. These policymakers point to the stunning failure in October of 1993 of private financing for the
so-called Carb6n II coal-fired electric power plant. The project, led by Mission Energy, a unit of
Southern California Edison, needed about $2 billion in non-recourse financing for a 1.6 GW
facility (A year later Mission, which dosed its office in Mexico City, announced that it would seek
business opportunities in China.) Additional discussion of financing issues is in George Baker,
"Challenges in petroleum policy for the next president of Mexico," Oil 6- Gas Journal, Jan. 17,
1994, pp.3343
19. The Virtual Market Model allows for (a) capital reinvestment of Pemex's earnings, (b) balance-
sheet debt financing by Pemex, (c) loan-guarantee financing from other governments (e.g., U.S.,
Canada, Japan Ex-Im Banks), (d) commercial, non-recourse financing (see note 5, supra, in rela-
tion to the Shell joint venture). This impressive range of funding mechanisms excludes the invest-
ments or contractor-advanced funds that could be available under either a Mixed or Virtual-
Mixed Economy.
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quarter of 1994 Norway and the United Kingdom together increased oil production by
22%, to 4.9 million b/d from a previous 4.0 million b/d in the first quarter of 1993, Mexico
oil production at 2.6 million b/d has been flat for most of a decade. Where the North Sea
has an aggregate annual capital budget at the level of US$9-10 billion, Pemex typically
receives from the government's finance ministry only US$2 billion for investments in E&P
in a given year. Scaled to the investment levels of the North Sea, Mexico's E&P efforts are
annually under-funded by nearly $5 billion dollars.20
Finally, in relation to regulations, the Virtual Market Economy relies basically on self-
regulation by Pemex and the CFE.21 The setting up of a Regulatory Energy Commission in
1993 to serve as a counterpart to the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
is, in theory, a step forward. Creating a Mexican FERC for electricity matters, however, is
still a long way from establishing local public utilities commissions (PUC) whose main
responsibility is to serve as a quasi-transparent public forum that balances the interests of
energy producers and transmission companies (Pemex and the CFE) with those of local
distributors and consumers. In the view of outside observers, the problem of not having the
equivalent of PUCs in Mexico seems intractable given the historic muscle advantage that
Pemex and the CFE have been able to flex within the Mexican political system. Not even the
creation of a cabinet-level Energy Ministry in the early 1980s has materially affected the vir-
tual independence with which Pemex and CFE have been able to operate.
V A New Policy Option - The Virtual Mixed Economy
It is likely that macroeconomic planners of the new administration of Dr. Ernesto
Zedillo will want a continuation of the basic command-model economy for the hydrocar-
bon sector. The need for major funding for onshore gas production in the North and deep-
water oil production in the Bay of Campeche will compete for equally demanding needs for
funding of social and economic infrastructure in Chiapas, Oaxaca, Michoacin, Guerrero,
and other areas noted for economic recession and political unrest. This competition for fed-
eral funds may lead to a reappraisal of the administration of Pemex by the post-Salinas gov-
ernment.
The programs of the Salinas Administration implicitly pointed to a new, yet untried,
policy option: a Virtual Mixed Economy designed to attract funds for both upstream and
downstream projects (Fig. 6).
Upstream, the new model would require that oil and gas producers work as contractors
for Pemex, but be paid by a compensation mechanism that would index reward to the effi-
ciency of production. The important points here are that ownership of the resource base
would remain with the State and operational control would remain with Pemex thereby
maintaining full state sovereignty. This model would entail neither sharing of production
20. The figure of $5 billion would be accurate provided that the difficulties and costs of production
were the same. In the North Sea, however, nominal production costs are higher than those of
Mexico.
21. A discussion of regulatory issues is discussed in George Baker, "Mexico must emulate U.S.,
Canada gas rules to boost its gas industry," Oil 6 GasJournal., Oct. 24, 1994, pp. 30-34.
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nor profits.22 With little new direct investment of its own, Pemex could gain the benefits of
new dry gas production in the North and new reservoir development and management
expertise for difficult plays in Campeche.
Downstream, the model could be used to fund infrastructure needs like the fifteen-year
overdue natural gas pipeline to Mexicali (the hometown of President Ernesto Zedillo) and
the nearby Rosarito thermoelectric plant. Another similar project needing funding is the
new gas pipeline that is to extend 700 kilometers from the gas fields of Villahermosa to the
electric power facility in the M&ida region (known as the Mrida III project).
Short of "privatizing pipelines" or incurring more public-sector debt to fund upstream
development and gas imports,23 the Virtual Mixed Economy offers perhaps the only fund-
able permutation of Mexico's traditional Command Model that will permit the needed
expansion of both the hydrocarbon and electric-power sectors. The task of implementing
that model will be as much a challenge for legal minds as it will be for market planners,
developers, regulators and prospective lenders. The "legal issue" is crucial and is not about
changing the niceties of contractual language. 24 The legal framework of a new Virtual
Mixed Economy will have to be built on institutional arrangements that balance the com-
peting interests of Pemex, the Federal Power Utility (CFE), developers, lenders, con-
sumers-as well as the environment and public safety.
As things stood at the end of 1994, investors doubted that they could trust the Mexican
court system, where ambiguity and unpredictability undermine expectations of equity by
Mexican and international companies. Here there are two matters: the Mexican courts have
never decided issues of Pemex liability to either the CFE or IPPs for costs associated with
problems of fuel supply; but, even if such cases had been decided, Mexican judges, operat-
ing under a civil-code legal system, have no obligation to decide on the merits of similar
cases in the same manner.
2 5
22. The devising of a politically acceptable compensation mechanism is a controversial, if technical,
matter, that depends on the political will and goodwill of the parties. The normal approach to
compensation is that from project revenues E&P contractors would be reimbursed their capital
and lifting costs then compensated for reservoir development and management services (RDMS)
as a negotiated percentage of the Income After Capital and Lifting Costs (IACLC). Pemex's gross
profits would be the gross income less (a) lifting costs, (b) allocation for capital recovery and (c)
RDMS fees. The complexity of this issue is increased in the case of natural gas, as the compensa-
tion mechanism in Mexico would have to start from an equivalent Gulf Coast market price. The
"price equivalency test," in turn, would have to take into account differences in the BTU content
of the gas and wellhead-to-grid transportation values.
23. A discussion concerning the outlook for natural gas imports is M.A. Kanter and P H. Kier,
Mexican Demand for U.S. Natural Gas (U.S. DOE, Sept. 1993 (available from NTIS: report#
ANU4EAIS/TM-104, Tel. [703] 487-4600).
24. A logical place to begin fresh legal analysis is the role of energy in NAFTA. See G. C. Watkins,
"Constitutional Imperatives and the Treatment of Energy in the NAFTA" Oil Gas Letter (ESC
Publishing), XII (7): 199-205 (July 1994).
25. A good discussion of the risk of the court system in Mexico is contained in a Pemex loan prospec-
tus issued by Goldman, Sachs in November, 1994.
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In April 1995, with the Mexican economy in a severe recession, the government
announced a change in investment policy in the energy sector: hoping to break the dead-
lock on project financing for private electric power projects (and, collaterally, to convince
Mexicans that their flight capital should be repatriated), a law was passed to allow private
ownership and operations of natural gas pipelines and storage facilities. For such a law to
have substantive effect, implementing regulations for natural gas transmission and distribu-
tion need to be passed.26 The importance of this policy innovation for the present discus-
sion is this: Pemex's model of a command economy will be undermined to the extent that
government regulators come to have an influence on the terms and tariffs of a policy of
open access to Pemex's pipeline system. If the government program succeeds, then in the
area of natural gas transmission the economy will have shifted to a mixed economy. Most
industry observers comment that the government will have to consider additional steps to
achieve its financing and energy policy objectives: they note, for example, that having new
gas lines does not produce new gas supplies.
V. Conclusion
If Mexico is to gain the full benefits from NAFTA, 27 it will not be enough that Pemex is
competitive: Mexico's export sector will grow in part because of market pressures in the
energy sector that work to reduce the costs--and the prices-of energy inputs. For this to
happen, the absence of trust and expectations of fairness that characterized much of the
inter-governmental-agency debate around energy policy during the Salinas years will have
to be eliminated. The government must create a new atmosphere, one that will win the sup-
port of Pemex and the CFE and that will attract the long-term commitment of a new class
of Pemex contractors, electric power developers and lenders. For any of this to take place, a
dramatic change of heart must take place in the assurances afforded by Mexico's legal sys-
tem.
26. The government reasons that by allowing private investment and operation of natural gas
pipelines the long-delayed funding for the electric power project at Samalayuca will materialize.
As already noted, the Salinas administration over the course of two years was unable to settle
major policy differences between agencies and ministries regarding natural gas regulation. The
new law calls for regulations within 180 days.
27. As the first eighteen months of NAFTA have amply shown, NAFTA also poses risks, not only for
Mexico but for U.S. border states as well. The author's lecture to the Heritage Foundation on
February 9, 1995, -examines the risks to Mexico associated with the dominant influence of
intrafirm trading in Mexican manufactured exports. The arguments appear in expanded form in
"El sector externo y recuperaci6n econ6mica en Mexico," Comercia Exterior (Mexico City), May,
1995.
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